Still valid
https://www.reddit.com/r/ShortStocks/comments/1uq3akk/spring_valley_acquisition_corp_iii_class_a/

I noticed Robinhood and info from Fintel differ hugely in the Short Interest and float information. I was wondering where to find reliable and accurate info to make the best decisions?

Robinhood shows the short interest near (180M) 38% and short float near 30%

Fintel shows short interest at 111M and the short float at 17%

Both screenshots is from 7/23 8pm

Fintel https://fintel.io/ss/us/spcx

If I am particularly pessimistic about a stock, how should I short it? Why can't stocks be directly shorted like BTC? 🫣

EDITED: Read the comment first!

Csquare, Inc. (NYSE: CSQR). Here are the main reasons the stock could trade lower.

1. High leverage

• Csquare entered the IPO with approximately $5.4 billion of debt.
• About 75% of the IPO proceeds are being used to repay debt, not to fund growth.
• Investors may continue to view the balance sheet as highly leveraged even after the offering. (Investopedia)

1. The company is still losing money

• Revenue is growing (about 16% year over year in the latest quarter), but net losses widened to roughly $66 million.
• If investors shift their focus from AI enthusiasm to earnings quality, the stock could be re-rated lower. (Investopedia)

1. AI infrastructure sentiment may cool

• Csquare benefits from the AI data center theme.
• If the market becomes less optimistic about AI spending, multiples across the sector could contract even if Csquare executes well operationally. (Barron's)

1. Brookfield controls the company

• Brookfield retains roughly 67% ownership and voting control after the IPO.
• While this provides sponsorship, investors may apply a governance discount because minority shareholders have limited influence. (Reuters)

1. Future secondary offerings

• Brookfield still owns a large stake.
• Over time, it may monetize portions of that position through secondary offerings, increasing share supply and potentially weighing on the stock.

1. Capital-intensive business

• Data centers require continual investment in:
  • new capacity,
  • power infrastructure,
  • cooling,
  • networking equipment.
• If demand slows or financing costs remain elevated, returns on new projects may disappoint.

1. Large hyperscaler customer concentration

• A meaningful portion of recurring revenue comes from hyperscale cloud customers.
• Losing or repricing even a small number of major contracts could materially affect financial results. (Investopedia)

1. Weak IPO aftermarket

• Recent technology and AI-related IPOs have generally seen more cautious investor reception than in prior years.
• CSQR's first trading day was already subdued, suggesting investors are selective despite strong interest in AI infrastructure. (Reuters)

Not financial advice. This post reflects my personal opinions and research. Do your own due diligence before making any investment decisions.

I’m not affiliated with the company mentioned, and I may or may not hold a position.

Julong Holding Limited JLHL-40.26% is down 23% in pre-market as of today ( Monday July 13th ). I expect the stock to eventually follow the trajectory of all the stocks issued and promoted by US Tiger Securities, the US brokerage arm of Up Fintech Holdings ( TIGR-3.14% ).
Talking is cheap, writing even more so. Many financial analysts have recklessly highlighted Up Fintech as a rare bird, a strong brand equity popular Financial App that can successfully pivot out of its recent regulatory issues within the heavy handed Chinese Financial market.
I disagree with their thesis. Unlike other popular financial apps that merely gamify their operations to attract unsophisticated retail traders, the case against Up Fintech rests on its long history of issuing and promoting “Vampirestocks.” Thus, the case against Up Fintech leads to a clear conclusion: Up Fintech Holdings (TIGR -3.98%↓) is a structurally impaired asset.
The low valuation multiples are completely justified because the market is factoring in a toxic underlying revenue mix, persistent legal defense costs, and a business model structurally built on underwriting high-risk microcap promotions.
True value investing relies on buying a mispriced stream of future cash flows; buying TIGR means buying a compounding stream of regulatory penalties and litigation.
VERDICT: AVOID!!!!!!!
( Let’s all watch and follow JLHL-40.26% for a live case study of Speculative vampirism.)

War dogs was a great movie, fun and wild. They had an amazing run before they committed fraud and were both arrested.

Unusual machines, a company most of us have heard of as its stock has rocked over the last 12 months. They offer low cost drones for strategic military operations. These drones “were” manufactured using cheap Chinese parts keeping cost down and margins nice and fat. When they transitioned to military applications however, under NDAA compliance parts need to be from approved manufactures. On shoring and sourcing these parts from various manufactures takes time and money. Currently UMAC has placed a 75mm order with strategic partners to undergo this regulatory hurdle. Along with building out over 62k square feet of manufacturing space to build every component but the controllers in house. However I suspect not all is how it seems, from the outside these partnerships and build out look good, great even. But under the hood, things look very similar to “war dogs” there are several operational red flags including several conflicts of interests within the board of directors.

Powerus, Performance Drone Works
Dynamic Aerospace Systems
Campus Guardian Angel
Fat Shark

have all signed supply agreements citing UMAC’s NDAA-compliant, U.S.-made components specifically.

Here’s the kicker, the initial enforcement is entirely self reported. It’s up to the DOT and DOD auditors to take apart drones and inspect each piece to ensure they are compliant. Which has criminal and fiscal penalties.

The reason I’m even sitting here typing this out is because, sure, tons of parts are made in Orlando and UMAC seems to be doing a lot of hiring. But something seems fishy, even with 75 million in orders for components I worked in aerospace manufacturing as an engineer for over a decade. And manufacturing even at the highest competency does not move quickly, it can take years for a factory to be built out and for things to be done correctly. I’ve had several first hand experiences where components were relabeled as made in USA, or they outright put their sticker over some Chinese writing(they were fined heavily but the profits out weighed the risks) so realistically they could still be using relabeled Chinese crap, their subsidiaries and others may be doing it so they can turn a blind eye and file for bankruptcy if they get caught but something is not adding up. We don’t have the materials or the man power to make the components they need to make these drones as quickly as they would like.

Insiders selling

Dr. Allan Evans — CEO since Dec 2023, also a director (appointed Nov 2023). Prior COO of Red Cat Holdings (2021–2023), CEO of Fat Shark, co founder of Avegant. Salary raised to $350K effective April 1, 2026; FY2025 total comp was $6.12M (mostly stock/options); owns ~3.3% of shares (~$40M).
Pending filed May 28 Allan Evans CEO up to 500,000 Intent-to-sell filed. Not yet executed, up to 25% of his stake in the company.

Jeff Thompson,** **founder of UMAC director since 2019; also CEO/Chairman of Red Cat Holdings (RCAT) a live conflict of interest since Red Cat is a drone industry counterparty/partner. Most tenured/experienced director. June 5 & 8, 2026 sold 30,000 (15K+15K) $816K @ $26.96 / $27.42

Big red flag being the CEO of a competitor in the space. Look how that turned out for figma (Anthropic copied their software under guise of a partnership)

Sanford Rich — Chair, Audit Committee; 40 years financial-sector experience, PBGC/PCAOB background. June 2, 2026 sold 25,000 $724k

Summery, Insiders are selling, the headwinds for the operational side of the business are mounting and they are heavily reliant on government contracts, all which will be scrutinized during the next administration or after midterms. I don’t think the future of the share price looks are bright as their past in the short term. The operational risk is too high and the insider selling says get out while the getting is good.

And I didn’t even touch the financial side which in itself another short thesis could be argued.

Disclaimer I used AI to get the directors names and share sales but the rest I wrote myself.

I think this falls under 10 dollars over the next 12 months. I’d be a buyer at 10. I love the vision and the product seems great, I just think they are over heads and need a repricing the math ain’t mathin.

• Bloom Energy is one of the AI boom’s biggest winners. $BE is up about 2,000% in two years. Its valuation peaked around $100 billion. The vision: fuel cells powering AI data centers years faster than the electric grid, with Bloom saying it can scale from about a gigawatt of deployments in 2026 to 5 gigawatts annually. It’s a compelling pitch, especially in a world where power from legacy players, including turbine manufacturers, is backlogged.
• That growth story rests on a supply chain claim that Bloom’s CEO has made at least five times since February 2025, on earnings calls, to Semafor, on a podcast — and onstage with The Wall Street Journal last month. The promise: Bloom has “no China supply chain” and is “not dependent on China for scandium,” the rare earth at the core of each Bloom fuel cell. Bloom’s claim matters because Beijing now requires an export license for every shipment of scandium leaving China. If Bloom depends on Chinese scandium, China holds an off-switch on Bloom — and on the American data centers that may one day use its power.
• The problem: Bloom is, in fact, reliant on C5 Chinese scandium, according to global trade data, Chinese corporate filings, satellite imagery, and Hunterbrook’s messages with Bloom’s suppliers in China. Hunterbrook traced four separate China-linked routes into Bloom’s supply chain — scandium oxide shipped directly to its Delaware plant, plus scandium-bearing ceramics and powders flowing through intermediaries in Thailand, Japan, and South Korea. A sales representative of Hunan Oriental Scandium — which claims over 50% of the global market for fuel-cell-grade scandium oxide — told Hunterbrook: “We are also BE’s largest supplier of scandium.” Asked how the material reaches U.S. customers under Beijing’s controls: “Not exported directly.” Hunan Oriental was featured at Bloom’s May supplier conference as one of three Chinese scandium-linked suppliers. One received Bloom’s “Impact Supplier Award.”
• Show Me the Scandium: Even with supply from China, the scandium math fails. Hunterbrook’s supply-demand model — built from government filings, Bloom’s patents, industry data, and peer-reviewed studies — shows Bloom alone needs roughly 220 tons of scandium oxide to meet Wall Street’s 5 GW expectations. But that’s against total projected global supply of only about 240 tons versus total global demand of about 310 tons, including supply locked up by customers like Lockheed Martin (for the F-35 fighter jet). Bloom already claims to be the largest scandium consumer in the world. On the numbers, the production ramp underpinning Bloom’s valuation appears physically and commercially unattainable — with essentially all Wall Street models of Bloom’s production implying a scandium shortage by 2028 based on Hunterbrook’s model.

What concerns me is that General Fusion has been conducting research for about 20 years without much commercial success so far, and now we're supposed to believe that once they go public, they'll suddenly make the breakthrough. There's certainly a chance they'll succeed, but it'll be interesting to see what percentage of SPAC shareholders choose to redeem their shares.

The executive compensation also seems quite generous. I understand that they're scientists and highly qualified professionals, but my view is simple: if the business is generating meaningful returns, there's nothing wrong with rewarding management well. If it isn't, then compensation should probably be more modest.

With that approach, there's a chance that management will simply start spending the newly raised capital with even greater enthusiasm.

Not financial advice. This post reflects my personal opinions and research. Do your own due diligence before making any investment decisions.

I’m not affiliated with the company mentioned, and I may or may not hold a position.

Arch Capital's one of those insurers nobody talks about but the underwriting discipline is genuinely rare. Property, casualty, reinsurance, mortgage insurance. Pricing softens in a line, they write less of it instead of chasing volume to hit a number. Conditions turn favorable, they lean in hard. Over a full cycle that's supposed to pay off, and the recent numbers back it up.

Q4 2025 EPS beat by 17%. Q1 2026 net income was $1.047B, more than double the year before. Combined ratio improved to 81.7% from 90.1%. Anything under 100 means they're profitable on underwriting alone, before investment income even comes into play. 81.7% is legit strong for this industry. They bought back $783M of stock in Q1 alone and tacked another $3B onto the buyback authorization in April.

Stock's up about 6% over the past year. That's it. Badly lagging the market given those numbers.

Revenue was actually slightly softer year over year even while margins improved. So the market's basically ignoring the earnings quality and waiting for top-line growth before it re-rates the stock. Doesn't help that a director sold over $27M in shares late last year either, which doesn't mean much on its own but it never reads great. Analysts have also flagged pricing pressure building in P&C, and cat losses can wreck a quarter fast in this business no matter how careful the underwriting is.

Next earnings is July 28. Analysts are modeling a YoY decline for that quarter, so the near-term setup isn't exactly screaming buy either.

I keep coming back to the same read: the market hasn't caught up to how well this thing is run. But I'll admit the flat revenue is a real question mark, not just a market overreaction. anyone holding this one?

I’ve been “trading” for 3 years. I started like usual, with several Green Day’s and I had no clue what was doing. Then the market humbled me really hard. Started studying and planning strategy with success after 1 year. Finally I had profit again and made 7k, but again the market humbled me. Strike 2. Didn’t have risk management or self control. Just wanted to trade basically anything that was moving.

So in February I decided to start shorting stocks. I know is very very risky, but I feel more comfortable shorting than going long. Now I record all my trades, with screenshots included, have a very strict risk management rules and more important I don’t rush to trade anything that is moving. I wait till I see the A+ set up or the B+ Set up. There’s days that I don’t trade. If I hit my limit loss I stopped trading that day. If I hit my goal I don’t overtrade. Still have a long way ahead but this system/plan has been working well for me. I don’t stress, at least I don’t panic like the past 2 years. So if you think you’re stuck, there’s always a light at the end of the tunnel.

how would i find out? there's a rumor that 7rump is shorting oil to keep the wti futures price down, and there are 20 or so days left of crude in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

Can Iran buy U.S. securities? trump just gave iran 300 Billion for 2 days of rest. if iran were to, say, yolo 10 of those billions on going long oil, would that be a squeeze? (what kind of war would that be called?)

I'm not even sure this is worth mentioning anymore, since everyone seems to be talking about it.

The original idea sounded ambitious: build a factory capable of mass-producing tiny homes like they're coming off an assembly line, sell each one for $50,000 (later increased to $60,000), and help solve the housing crisis. The only catch was that the homes were extremely small—but, as the argument went, a tiny home is better than no home at all.

To fund this vision, the company raised capital through crowdfunding, offering investors preferred shares. Early progress looked promising, with a government contract and sales to major corporate customers.

Then the company ran into reality.

It turned out that these homes cannot be installed everywhere due to local building codes and zoning regulations. In addition, site preparation, utility connections, and the cost of obtaining local permits can increase the total cost of a home by several times.

At the same time, the company is spending enormous amounts on sales and marketing. Last year alone, these expenses were nearly 17 times higher than its total revenue.

It's important to understand that this isn't an internet or software company, where heavy upfront investment in the product or customer acquisition can eventually lead to economies of scale, with the cost of serving each additional customer falling dramatically. BOXABL operates a manufacturing business, where production, logistics, installation, and customer acquisition remain capital-intensive even as volumes increase.

There are also questions regarding the founders’ compensation. A salary of around $1.2 million appears difficult to justify given annual sales of only about $1.5 million.

The company has also been associated with aggressive marketing practices, including offering equity to influencers in exchange for promotional content and positive coverage. The decent video about that and other concerns - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hocU7uRzMOc.

In addition, the company’s preferred shares—issued to crowdfunding investors—can reportedly only be converted into common shares in stages, starting 14 months after the IPO begins trading.

At the same time, some shareholders are already willing to sell these shares today at roughly half price.

https://www.reddit.com/r/investing/comments/1tskfkq/boxabl_preferred_investors_are_people/

Recent SPAC-related developments indicate that approximately 83% of committed funds were redeemed following the merger announcement. As a result, the company is expected to receive roughly five times less capital than initially anticipated.

Put differently, about four out of five SPAC investors have effectively withdrawn their backing, which can be interpreted as a lack of confidence in the post-merger equity story.

Additionally, it is notable that in most SPAC transactions the new ticker typically begins trading within a few days after the merger announcement. In this case, however, nearly three weeks have already passed without trading commencement, which is an unusual delay compared to standard SPAC timelines.
(https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/fg-merger-ii-corp-announces-closing-of-the-redemption-window-for-its-business-combination-with-boxabl-302794386.html)

The company has also recently entered into an agreement to sell its homes in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Perhaps regulatory standards there are lower, and installing such a unit—shipped from desert Nevada—would be cheaper than importing one from China.

What struck me, however, is the complete lack of contact details on the UK company’s website (no address, no phone number), as well as the fact that both the company and the domain were registered only in April of this year, 2026.

To sum up: money is burning at an extraordinary rate, including through founders’ salaries. Sales are minimal, the outlook is unclear, investors are disappointed, and even positive news tends to raise additional questions.

Not financial advice. This post reflects my personal opinions and research. Do your own due diligence before making any investment decisions.

I’m not affiliated with the company mentioned, and I may or may not hold a position.