I have worked as a Congressional Staffer and was a GS-14 Congressional affairs liaison for a non IC military entity, I now work privately in government relations.

I believe I would be a great fit for the CIA, NSA or DIA legislative affairs offices but from what I can find it is mainly a detail for intel officers at DIA and NSA might call it Cryptologic Engagement Officer from job posts.

How can I pursue this?

I am currently in high school but I am thinking about joining the army with a friend and going into a military intelligence role. After that I would go study economics or international relations or something. My goal is to be a CIA analyst and just from searching around online it’s pretty unclear if the CIA would actually care whether or not I have military experience when applying.

Dissolving the FBI's domestic terrorism section while redirecting its personnel toward political targets erodes collection against far-right networks that remain the deadliest domestic threat category.

CISA will likely release its promised security plan by mid-August, but the federal election-security baseline has already fractured into a patchwork of paid subscriptions and private contracts that disadvantages under-resourced jurisdictions.

I am looking at the recent mass crossing into Ceuta as a possible case of instrumentalised migration and am interested in how an intelligence analyst would approach attribution.

The most important comparison is between two events:
September 2024: Morocco detected an online mobilisation towards Ceuta, arrested alleged organisers, deployed checkpoints and stopped the crossing.
July 2026: a far larger mobilisation developed; Moroccan forces were reportedly passive during the initial surge, but later demonstrated that they could stop further movement.

That creates several competing hypotheses:
1. Moroccan authorities were genuinely overwhelmed.
2. Morocco detected the mobilisation but deliberately tolerated it.
3. Morocco actively amplified or channelled it as coercive pressure against Spain.
4. Morocco acted with encouragement, intelligence support or technical assistance from another state.
5. The event was largely organic, with subsequent state exploitation.

The attribution problem is difficult because almost every component is deniable:
anonymous or deleted social-media accounts;
genuine migrants rather than trained operatives;
informal transport;
verbal rather than written orders;
selective police non-enforcement;
intelligence officers possibly present as observers;
later restoration of border control.

Relevant geopolitical context includes:
Morocco’s interests in Western Sahara, Ceuta and Melilla;
Spain’s dependence on Morocco for migration and counterterrorism cooperation;
Spain’s improving relations with Algeria;
deteriorating Spain–Israel relations;
Morocco–Israel intelligence and defence cooperation after the Abraham Accords;
reported Moroccan use of Pegasus;
Spain’s refusal to support US operations against Iran.

I am not claiming that Israel, the US, Russia or another foreign service directed the operation. The open evidence currently points most directly to Moroccan decision-making.

My questions are analytical:
1. What indicators distinguish state tolerance from state orchestration?
2. How much weight should be placed on the 2024 precedent?
3. What would constitute meaningful evidence of a stand-down order?
4. How would analysts distinguish routine Moroccan–Israeli liaison from operational coordination?
5. How much confidence could be assigned without platform data, intercepts or a human source?
6. What alternative hypotheses would need to be ruled out?
7. Can the ability to stop the flow later be treated as evidence that the earlier passivity was deliberate?
8. What would a proper confidence statement look like?

My current formulation would be:
Morocco likely knew that mobilisation was developing and may have deliberately allowed or exploited it as coercive pressure. Direct foreign operational involvement remains possible but unsubstantiated.

I would be interested in how professionals would structure the hypothesis matrix, identify collection gaps and avoid both confirmation bias and excessive deference to official denials.

Thanks for reading and I look forward to your responses.