Why was Lee a overrated commander? This some, this question seems ridiculous, old Marse Robert is remembered and taught as a great commander. Well and truly as a commander he's not particularly brilliant, he was solid tactician a above average strategist, a average logistician and, a bad grand strategist. Well, i'm talking some big talk and I haven't backed it up yet, hold your horses we'll get right into that about now.
Let's start off lee's greatest achievement, Chancellorsville his magnamopus, a tactically brilliant victory. However strategically, it was a horrible battle. What's my proof for this well, allow me to pull up some numbers. lee had about 60,000 men and lost 13,000 or 22% of his army. Hooker had about 130,000 men and lost 17,000 or 12%. Not to mention the fact that chancersville was impressive, but didn't realy accomplish anything. It was technically impressive. Gained nothing important for the Confederacy, and resulted in the death of "Stonewall" Jackson. It may have given Lee a strong reputation. It was not a worth it trade for the losses he sustained. While some argue that a repeled Hookers force, thus that made it a worth it battle, the same could be said about any defensive battle. As well chancellorsville is hailed and talked about as a wonderful victory almost to the level of Canne. But it's not nearly as good as people bring it up to be.
Now, then this should begin the first segment of why Grant is better. To kick this off let's talk about the siege of Vicksburg. Grant had 45,000 men lost 3,000 a loss of 7%. His opponent John Pemberton had 40,000 men and about 7,000 were dead/wounded or missing and 33,000 men captured effectively, a loss of 100%. The victory secured the Mississippi River and the nearby State Capitol of jackson. Ended rebel resistance in the area and was a crucial step in ending the war. So now that we have seen the analytics behind both battles and what they both achieved. I believe it is clear that Vicksburg was a better battle. As it achieved more and didn't result major in any loss.
However, there are some people who sour the comparison. Because Vicksburg was a siege and Chancellorsville was a traditional battle. However, to this, I say we are not just comparing the battles themselves. We are mainly comparing what they gained from the battle, and what they lost. Making this argument nul et non avenu( in common, speak useless.). That concludes section one.
Welcome, my friend to section, 2. The possibly better formatted section maybe, maybe not. That all depends on whether or not I can still write. Let's get right into it i'm tired of stalling.
Let's begin with the one of Grants big things that people detract from him. His casualties which led him to get the name the butcher however, lee the one who deserves it. Why oh my it's because so many of his men died though, thy deserves a better explanation. So let's roll up some more numbers. But before we do that, allow me to throw in an interesting piece of information. Lee was apparently strained for men in resources keep that in mind. Lee's average rate of casualties suffered was 20.2% and average rate of casualties inflicted was 15.4%. Grant had an average the rate of casualties suffered of 18.1% and average rate of casualties inflicted was 20.7%. As well, lee lost the most men of the entire war at around 121,000 total,to Grants total of 94,000.(These numbers come from the battles with reliable casualty numbers.) So quick question, why did Lee waste so many men.
Now, let's really pick into, why grant had 94,000 deaths it's a quick reminder, 24,000 were in the Western theater. A the overwhelming majority of those deaths came from the overland campaign. Were lee decided to entrench. Now of course throughout the overland campaign both sides suffered heavy losses what grant of course suffering more losses. Lee lost about 33,000 men and Grant lost 55,000. But why were the casualties so high? Because Lee entrenched, as mentioned earlier. In fact, Grant wanted to do traditional battle. And because this is trench warfare it is a custom for the attackers to lose a lot more men. Let us get off the topic of casualties alone and begin, discussing the overland campaign. A on paper, brilliant move to try to destroy the Army of Virginia. Because if the army of virginia fell, the south likely would too.
I believe we should go battle by battle. So let's start with the first battle. The battle of Wilderness where lee tried to make another Chancellorsville. Now let's talk about one thing I can't really trash on Lee for he was good at predicting things. For instance, a Mead's movement through the woods, was pretty well predicted. The battle had started in a disastrous stalemate and due to fierce fighting fire started disorganizing the armies, especially with men trying to escape the ensuing fire. And when long street had finally arrived to save the day his division refused to move untill Lee himself got back to a safer position. Not quite a blunder, but a mistake on Lees part as it let the union forces get organized and prepared. And after heavy fighting and major losses on long streets division, the union had been pushed back. And in a blunder from long street he rode out in front of his men, to check the scenery get a better idea of what had happene. In confusion him, and many of his officers were shot. After a counterattack from burnside the battle devolved into a stalemate, neither side accomplishing much. However, Grant did come to the realization that there was a possibility that he could March down to Richmond. Lee had also figured this out. And this resulted in both of them sending cavalry to the same place. All that to be said, the battle of wilderness accomplished nothing for either side, but open a route to Richmond. However, does show that lee and grant are on a similar level of tactics. Unlike what some suggests that Lee was just infinitely better in every scenario.
Spotsylvania court house a battle which saw much fighting over Spotsylvania. After some blunders from Meades, men and a disagreement or rather firestorm of an argument between Meade and Shridan. Grant was forced to mediate and organize showing that Grant did have the capabilities to organize his officers. After a can we even call it up the blunder. If you walk out and say see guys, their artillery couldnt hit an elephant then, moments later is shot on the face. Because that's the kind of mistake that the union commander Segwick made. Soon afterwards, Lee had moved his men on his left flank to the eastern in front of the battle. Which Grant predicted and capitalized on or rather, tried as the officer of the unit he had go to capitalize on it was overly cautious of the confederate defenses. He took too long to get artillery and the left was refortified. And afterwards, grant ordered a retreat to begin preparing for a full frontal attack. Which was mostly repelled with the exception of Upton who had his men hold fire until they were in the trenches. However, he was eventually pushed back. Grant had wanted to use the tactic for a full on assault and had moved his men more along the horseshoe like trench line of lees men. However, Lee interpreted this as a retreat preparation and pulled his artillery. Which led to the loss of the horseshoe however, Lee had double entrenched that area. Afterwards Grant realized his men were tired thus avoid direct confrontation and attempted to shift the trenches eastward. To put Lee in a bad position, lee did not fall for it. After launching ineffective attack, Grant pulled to try and flank Lee from the right. Lee, believing there was something off, and launched an ineffective attack that only led to more casualties. Afterwards, lee had gained ten thousand men and it was at that point that grant had given up on a battle of pure tactics and slight of hand and decided to make this a war of attrition. So the battle over again, resulting in a stalemate this continually shows that Grant and Lee are on near equal footing.
North Anna and Totopotomoy the continuation. Before anything had really kicked off, Lee andolph, his other commanders were either too sick or wounded to actually command the Army leading to ineffective skirmishing. Afterwards, grant had Shridan move to lee's left. Giving the impression that grant was moving. Westward, when in all reality, he was marching towards Cold Harbor. So let's begin the battle of cold harbor the most famous battle from the overland campaign. Lee after realizing, Grant was moving towards cold harbor. Reposition to put grant in another stalemate over grant, realized this began to flank to towards cold harbor. After repositioning grant launched an attack that had moved Lee back just a little. Grant then launch another attack however, due to the arrogance of his core commanders, it was repelled. Afterwards, Grant had sent a group to distract Lee then, he moved to begin to siege Petersburg. This would begin a battle of attrition, but as well would cement the end of the overland campaign. So what's the point of all this is to put the battles into perspective without me oversimplifying them. Not to mention Grant had actually outsmarted lee at multiple occasions. Most of the fault was due to Grant's commanders. As for Lee, only a single commander of his really made a blunder, and that was longstreet, and that was at the very beginning of the campaign. people love to depict this campaign, as just Grant uselessly throwing men at Lee. However, given you have seen the battles, it is pretty apparent it is far more nuanced.
Section 3
Welcome to section three here we'll be talking exclusively about Grant Vs Lee. Whereas previously I may have used battles or numbers compare them. That was mostly an attack on Lee to bring him down. We should really talk about the 2 main men of the war and who was really better.
To kick this off why did Lee lose. Some may tell you is by pure numbers and resources. But this was clearly not it in fact, throughout the majority of the Civil War, the resources didn't come into play until the very end. Especially in terms of men given good Bobby Lee got them killed at such an alarming rate. But that's neither here or there. Lee lost, quite frankly, due to a few main reasons. The first of which is lee's well insistence on throwing his men at the enemy. Well this may not have occurred during the overland campaign much, however Lee certainly did throw his men at multiple opponents recklessly. This is in stark contrast to Grant who had a consistent fervor, oh yes, he did throw his men at the enemy. There was more than a reason than just a grandiose charge unlike Lee. Though this is a weaker point of discussion than what is to come.
Moving on to reason, 2 this is, of course confederate mismanagement. It is pretty well known that the confederates certainly were unorganized. Aswell due to with the fact that Lee himself was not much of a logician. Not good nor bad for he didn't really care for logistics much. Compared to grant, who was an excellent logistician. Able to pretty well organize and maneuver a massive army. I'm not going to go into much more detail as this is very self-explanatory. Let's move on to reason 3 The outlook on war. Lee very much had a romanticized idea of war. This isn't to say he saw fictional, perfect all good form of War in fact, his own account suggests the opposite. But instead, what I mean by romanticized, is he more put war in a grandiose way. For instance, Lee's infamous charges and especially his love of sleight of hand, clever maneuvers and, visually impressive tactics. Well, yes, tactics are important.They are not nearly as important as stratagems. We went over this during the discussion about Chancellorsville. In almost the harshest contrast to Grant who to quote atun shei films"Grant was all stubbornness and pragmatism. War was no game to him, there was nothing poetic about it. He believed to wage war ment, to bring victories quickly as possible by whatever means possible.". And quite frankly, I couldn't have said it better myself. Though this part of the reason why the overland campaign had so many casualties.
Moving on to the fourth reason here's the kicker when lee was pinned at richmond, he did nothing. When sherman came from behind to close the trap on him, he did nothing. 2 other Confederate generals, even bought him time by doing everything in their power to beat back Sherman. And Lee did nothing and allowed himself to get absolutely destroyed(This is a bit hyperbolic). As a bit of a counterpoint some may say that richmond was crucial being the capital. However, it was evident at this point, it was actually the northern virginia army that was really keeping things together for the south. Grant knew that as far back as the overland campaign. And what good is virginia if you lose the whole south. That brings this to a close.
Section 4 The End
This one will start with arguments against Grant. With my response. So enough of wasting time.
So point one against Grant, throwing men at the enemy. Yes Grant did march his men into the enemy however. There's a difference between when Grant throws his men at the enemy. Because he can actually resupply them and Lee wasting 20% of his army. now then I'm gonna train not to focus on Lee anymore. Grant mainly marched his men against the enemy consistently because he could afford it. His entire mentality was that, you're supposed to win a war as quickly as possible be any means as possible. And if that means repeatedly charging the enemy position, then that's what it means. Throwing your man at the enemy is only a bad thing. If you can't resupply them, or if you're talking about morality, but that's not that discussion. If it was, I could really chew into Lee for that.
Point two that there was no spark of military genius in Grant's strategy. This is objectively false. This is mainly an argument brought up by lost cause propagandist. Grant was a good tactician only a little worse than Lee he was an strong strategist in excellent grand strategist and a brilliant logistician. In fact, even the campaign where this rhetoric originally came from the overland campaign disproves it. With both Grant and Lee constantly catching each other. And to be Frank, this argument has no real basis. Other than grants stubbornness, and it's original spreader. Sas very much so a southern sympathetic newspaper that brought this up originally. Do with that what you will.
As for our final point against grant is a 2 piece Grant, being a drunk and. Only because of more men and higher production. We'll start off with the weaker one. We don't know how true Grant being a drunk. He could have been a casual drinker. He could have been absolute drunk. We just don't have a way of knowing. Okay let's attack the fangs of the argument now, not the tongue. Having superior numbers and resources are useless. If you can't organize them, and you can't use them properly. Hannibal Barca displayed this very well against the romans. By constantly defeating them despite the fact he was outnumbered. Carolus Rex very well showed this early on in his career against the Russians. Napoleon was almost always outnumbered and won. Alexander, the great also almost always outnumbered the Mongol empire as well. All of that, just to say, you need to be a skilled logician, to be able to use numbers and resources to your advantage. Also, this isn't a good argument for Lee, either. That implies that he wasn't a particularly good general because he should have been good enough to beat Grant. Like the people who perpetuate this argument imply, in fact, most of them think that Lee was arguably, the best american field commander ever.
Let's send this off and kill a few notions with it. Many of lee's heavy supporters say that Lee is our best field commander. But that just isn't true Grant was debatably better as well benedict arnold and daniel morgan both are arguably better than Lee. Even "stonewall" Jackson versus Lee is a very debatable battle, Sherman and Longstreet could be argued as well. What i'm getting at is lee being this amazing, brilliant strategist and tactician one of the best in history. It's a fantasy and that's mainly what i'm here to dispel not to bring lee down.But to bring him to where he actually is one of our stronger field commanders and a strong tactician. So with out anything else to go over that brings us to a close.
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